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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
Four other cases12 reported during 1954 which also warrant considera-
tion in this article are discussed in the article on Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure in this survey.
CLAEE D. RUssEmL
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Commencement of Action to Acquire'
Jurisdiction in Divorce
The concept of the commencement of an action has always been at least
two-fold in Ohio. If counsel is considering it from the standpoint of toll-
ing the applicable statute of limitations he knows that he must file his
petition and perfect service thereon within sixty days after the running of
the statute.' If, however, he is not concerned with the statute of limitations,
but only with having a firm basis for supporting an attachment or injunc-
tion, he need only have filed -his petition and caused summons to issue there-
on.2 A failure to serve the summons does not invalidate the attachment
made after summons was issued.3
The Ohio Supreme Court dearly established a third (and apparently
highly important) category in Gehelo v. Gehelo.4 The husband lived in
Ashtabula County, and his wife lived in Cuyahoga County. The husband
commenced an action in divorce in Ashtabula County, this probably -being
the only proper venue for his action,5 on October 30, 1951. Several ob-
viously good faith efforts on his part to serve wife in Cuyahoga County
proved unsuccessful. The wife apparently learned of the pendency of her
husband's action, for she went into Ashtabula County and obtained leave
to plead on December 11, 1951.6 She did not follow this action with any
f rther appearance or pleading. The husband then commenced service by
-publication on January 2, 1952, but -before the six weeks of publication
could be completed, the wife filed a divorce petition against her husband in
Cuyahoga County on January 18, 1952, and obtained service on him in
Ashtabula County on January 23, 1952. The question therefore became
one whether the Ashtabula County or Cuyahoga County court of common
pleas, courts of concurrent and coexistent jurisdiction, had jurisdiction.
The supreme court held, Judge Hart vigorously and cogentli dissenting,
that the Cuyahoga County court had first obtained jurisdiction, to the ex-
' State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St. 213, 118 N-.E2d 517 (1954); Village of Avon v.
Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d 254 (1954); Ex parte Karnes, 67 Ohio L
Abs. 455, 121 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio App. 1954); State v. Sellers, 66 Ohio L Abs. 535,
118 N.E.2d 193 (Ohio App. 1954).
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dusion of the Ashtabula County court. Commencement of publication, it
said, was not completion of service, nor did the wife's leave to plead confer
jurisdiction on the Ashtabula court. Since the Cuyahoga court first com-
pleted service, it obtained jurisdiction.
The dissenting opinion conceded that at the time the wife commenced
her action in Cuyahoga County the court had not yet acquired that degree
of jurisdiction which would have enabled it to render a final judgment or
decree. But, as it carefully pointed out, even in statute of limitation situa-
tions, service commenced prior to the running of the statute but completed
after the running is held to date back to the time when it was instituted, and
in Ohio this is specifically provided by statute in instances of service by
publication. Likewise, while the majority opinion in effect holds that
divorce is not a civil action when it holds that a divorce action is not com-
menced merely by filing a petition and causing summons to issue thereon,8
the provisions of Chapter 3 (Divorce and Alimony), Division VII, Title IV,
Part Third of the Ohio General Code contained no express statutory pro-
vision with respect to the commencement of a divorce or alimony action,
thus, in effect, relegating a litigant to the Code of Civil Procedure
On the other hand, it was provided under the Ohio General Code'0 and
is provided under the Ohio Revised Code'" that publication in divorce cases
is to be as in ordinary civil actions. Furthermore, as the dissent points out,
had the husband in his lawsuit obtained an attachment on any of his wife's
property orders of an in rem nature could have been made by the hus-
band's court immediately upon the filing of the petition and issuance of
summons, and before any service was completed.'" This writer is tempted
'OMo REv. CODE § 2305.17.
2OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2703.01, 2703.02, 2715.01.
'Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U.S. 299, 306, 59 Sup. Ct. 877, 881 (1939);
Ex parte Cattell, 146 Ohio St. 112, 64 N.E.2d 416 (1945).
' 160 Ohio St. 243, 116 NE.2d 7 (1953); for another case in which the same issue
arose but did not require adjudication, see Baxter v. Baxter, 115 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio
App. 1950).
'OHIO REv. CODE § 3105.03.
'Why she did so is not stated, since there is no rule day in a divorce action. Orno
REV. CODE § 3105.09. As the court pointed out in the majority opinion, her action
made no difference insofar as the Common Pleas Court of Ashtabula County was
concerned, since in a divorce action in Ohio there must be service of summons on
the defendant. See Tucker v. Tucker, 143 Ohio St. 658, 56 N.E.2d 202 (1944).
'Omo REv. CODE § 2305.17.
'OHIo REV. CODE § 2703.01.
'Nor do the equivalent provisions of the Ohio Revised Code Sections 3105.05,
3105.06.
OHIo GEN. CODE § 8003-7.
"See note 9, supra.
"Citing Benner v. Benner, 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N.E. 569 (1900) and Pennington
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to ask how the Ohio Supreme Court would have solved the dilemma if
such attachment had been secured by the husband on his wife's property be-
fore she obtained service on him in her action.
Commencement of Action to Toll Statute of Limitations
In last year's summary of developments in the field of Civil Procedure,13
mention was made of the decision of the Cuyahoga County court of appeals
in the case of Kossuth v. Bear. 4 During 1954 the case was carried to the
supreme court and decided by it, with a different result from that reached
in the lower appellate court.
Plaintiff was injured as a result of defendanes negligence in an auto-
mobile accident in Lorain County in May of 1948, at which time defendant
lived in Lorain County. Defendant moved to Cuyahoga County in August or
September of 1949. For some unexplained reason plaintiff had filed an
action against defendant in Cuyahoga County in April of 1949, giving de-
fendant's address as "Cleveland, Ohio." No service was ever made on de-
fendant in this action within the time provided by the applicable statute
of limitations.15 An amended petition was filed months after the statute
ran, alleging absence from the state and concealment of himself by the de-
fendant, 'by this time a resident of California, and service was obtained
upon the Secretary of State under the provisions of the non-resident motor-
ists statute.'8
Likewise, the plaintiff filed a similar action in Lorain County on the
day before the running of the applicable statute of limtations.17 Service
was attempted but was never made in this action, and the action was "dis-
missed without prejudice" by the court after the statute of limitations had
run
The Cuyahoga County case was tried on the basis of the service of the
amended petition on the Secretary of State, and judgment went for plaintiff.
Defendant appealed. The court of appeals ruled s favorably for defendant
on his contentions that his temporary absences from the State of Ohio dur-
ing the running of the statute had not served to toll it and that on the
v. Fourth National Bank of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 620, aff'd, 92 Ohio St.
517, 112 N.E. 1085 (1915).
'See 5 WEST. Ras. L. R.V. 247 (1954).
14161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.B.2d 285 (1954).
Omo REV. CoDE S 2305.10.
"OHIO R V. CODE 5 2703.20.
"Of course, by this time the defendant was living in Cuyahoga County, although
under the applicable venue provisions service could have issued to and been made
in Cuyahoga out of Lorain. See OHIo REv. CODE §§ 4515.01 and 2703.04.
' 96 Ohio App. 219, 114 N.E.2d 80 (1953).
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evidence presented he could not have been held to have been concealing
himself. But on defendanes contention that the failure of plaintiff to ob-
tain service on defendant in the Cuyahoga County action until after the
the statute of limitations had fully run was a bar to the filing and prosecu-
tion of the amended petition, the court of appeals ruled against defendant.
In other words, the appellate court held that plaintiff had commenced an
action within the statute of limitations and had failed "otherwise than upon
the merits."
The defendant appealed further and finally prevailed. The supreme
court' pointed out that while Section 2305.19, Ohio Revised Code pro-
vides that
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due
time... the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited for the commencement of such action at the date of... failure has
expired, the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year....
The words " ... commenced, or attempted to be commenced... " must be
read in connection with Section 2305.17, Ohio Revised Code.20 This sec-
tion dearly shows that "commenced" and "attempt to commence" are met
only 'by the accomplishment of valid service either within the running of
the statute or, at the latest, within sixty days after it has run. Since in this
case no service was ever made until after the sixty-day period which may
be tacked on to the end of a statute of limitations, no action was ever com-
menced or attempted to be commenced within the meaning of the saving
statute. Thus did the supreme court settle at last a vexing question, often
approached by it but never quite reached, since its previous decisions were
always made without the necessity of ruling on the identical fact situation."'
Similarly, the court of appeals for Madison County held, in Geyer v.
New York Central R.R. Co.,212 that when a petition is filed and a precipe
issued within the statute of limitations, but summons is not issued until
after the statute has run, the defendant may properly plead the bar of the
statute. While questioning whether the onus of requiring the derk of courts
"See note 14, supra.
""An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to 2305.22, in-
clusive, and section 1307.08 of the Revised Code, as to each defendant, at the date
of the summons which is served on him or on a codefendant who is a joint contrac-
tor, or otherwise united in interest with him. When service by publication is proper,
the action is commenced at the date of the first publication, if it is regularly made.
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to commence an action is equiv-
alent to its commencement, when the party diligently endeavors to procure a service,
if such attempt is followed by service within sixty days."
'Ross v. Willett, 54 Ohio St. 150, 42 N.E. 697 (1896); Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Co. v. Ambach, 55 Ohio St. 553, 45 N.E. 719 (1896); McLarren v. Myers, 87
Ohio St. 88, 100 N.E. 121 (1912).
"95 Ohio App. 539, 121 N.E.2d 62 (1953).
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to do his duty promptly ought to be placed upon the plaintiff, the court
felt itself bound by prior adjudications to the same effect by the supreme
court.2 3  It likewise held, in what is admittedly obiter dictum, that the
statutory provisions24 for service of process upon a railroad company are
exclusive, and that even assuming that defendant railroad's principal office
was outside of the State of Ohio, the statute of limitations applicable to
plaintiff's cause of action was not suspended by such "absence" from the
state, since such a defendant must be served under the specific statutory
provisions therefor.2
5
Venue of Actions- Suit to Cancel Mechanics' Lien
and to Quiet Title Against Same
In the case of Gustafson v. Buckley28 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that an action to cancel a mechanics' lien filed against realty, and to quiet
the title to such property as against such lien is not an action for the re-
covery of real property or of an estate or interest therein, or for its partition,
or for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or for the enforcement of a lien or
other incumbrances or charge thereon. Therefore, in the face of objections
to venue, such action cannot be brought in the county where the property
lies under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.32, but must
be brought where the lien claimant resides or may be found, under the
provisions of Section 2307.39. This case is discussed more fully in a note
in a prior issue of the Western Reserve Law Review. 7
Real Party in Interest
Suit for Damages by Bailee of Automobile
At common law a bailee or other person having possession could sue
for trespass or in trover for damages to or wrongful withholding of an
article of personalty injured by a third peron. The question was raised
in Petismeyer v. Omar Baking Co. 2' whether, in the light of the statutory
provision that
No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title,
claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or dispo6ed
' See note 20, supra.
Orno REv. CODE § 2703.10.
The court distinguished on their facts the cases of Commonwealth Loan Co., Inc.,
v. Firestone, 148 Ohio St. 133, 73 N.E.2d 501 (1947) and Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio
St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950). Compare also the discussion of a somewhat sim-
ilar problem at 5 WEs'T. REs. L. REv. 243 (1954).
:' 161 Ohio St. 160, 118 N.E.2d 403 (1954).
=6 WnsT. 1tEs. L. REy. 89 (1954).
95 Ohio App. 37, 117 N.E.2d 184 (1952).
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of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title
or manufacturer's or importer's certificate issued... I"
a wife may prosecute an action for damages to an automobile to which her
husband has such certificate but which was driven by her at the time the
damage was incurred. The court of appeals for Franklin County decided
that the statute does not abrogate the common law right of a bailee to main-
tain such an action. It distinguished Mielke v. Leeberson,0 on the ground
that in an action for damages to the automobile no question of title in the
strict sense of the word was involved, since the plaintiff was not contest-
ing with the defendant over the ownership of the chattel, nor did the matter
at issue concern the sale, disposal, mortgage or encumbrance of the
vehicle. The court pointed out that the Code provision could hardly be
extended to prevent a garage owner or mechanic from asserting a lien or
claim upon an automobile which he had stored or repaired, although he
would necessarily not require its owner to give him a certificate of title
before doing so, and followed a recent decision of the Summit County
court of appeals in a case which allowed the establishment of a purchase
money resulting trust on a motor vehicle without the showing of the re-
quired certificate.31
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Mandamus
The Ohio Constitution32 confers upon the Supreme Court original jur-
isdiction in (among other extraordinary remedies) mandamus, and pro-
vides that "No law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall
be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."
Of course, a concurrent jurisdiction exists in courts of appeals 3 and com-
mon pleas.
3 4
There can be little doubt that parties litigant have taken great and per-
haps undue advantage of this grant of jurisdiction, in resorting in the first
instance to the highest court in cases which could probably be just as well
settled at a lower level, and further, in treating as actions in mandamus
many cases which are really nothing more than proper subjects for manda-
tory injunction in equity, 5 but which, of course, would not as injunction
m OHIO RI .CoDE § 4505.04.
150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948); 4 WEST. Ra. L REV. 251 (1953).
"Douglas v. Hubbard, 91 Ohio App. 200, 107 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
OHIO CONST. Art IV, Sec. 2.
"OHIO CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 6.
"OHIO GONST. Art. IV, Sec. 3; OHIo RBv. CODE § 2731.02.
' Except for the fact that they are brought against a public official to enforce the
performance of a non-discretionary duty imposed by law.
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suits receive as of right the trial preference to which the extraordinary
remedies are entided. 86
The supreme court, in State ex rel. Allied Wheel Products, Inc., v. In-
dustrial Commission3" took a deep breath and laid down the rule that it
would simply decline to grant the writ, in the exercise of its discretion,
when the purpose of the relator is primarily the enforcement or protection
of purely private rights. This will, the court feels, avoid both a clogging
of its docket and prevent the gaining of a preferential position thereon;
it will not prejudice applicants for the writ, since the court, in declining to
issue writs in such instances, refuses to pass on the merits of the case, and
thus no res judicata problem will present itself. The relator will simply be
remitted to a lower court.
The decision has aroused strong criticism,33 particularly for its reliance
upon an Illinois case39 which is based upon a constitutional provision
not containing the prohibition against any limitation upon invoking the
jurisdiction. This writer is of the opinion that a statutory redefinition of
the scope of the writ of mandamus might be both appropriate and also a
solution to the inconsistency between the constitutional provisions and
the supreme court's position.
Jurisdiction of Courts - Service by Publication to Impose
Constructive Trust on Shares of A Domestic
Corporation
In Silberman v. Silberman ° the court of appeals for Cuyahoga County
had before it a question of first instance in Ohio, whether jurisdiction could
be acquired by Ohio courts to impose a constructive trust upon shares of
stock, not themselves before the'court, by service by publication upon their
non-resident owners.
The facts are not made entirely dear by the opinion, but it appears
that, having in his possession $45,000 belonging jointly to himself, his
brother and sisters, plaintiff made an agreement with them whereby said
funds were deposited with a third party for the purpose of purchasing two
separate parcels of realty (the situs of which is not set forth in the opinion).
The third party caused two corporations to be formed (apparently in the
State of Ohio; both corporations had statutory agents in Ohio who were
personally served in the action 'brought by plaintiff) which received by
' OI-Io Rnv. CODE § 2503.37.
p161 Ohio St. 555, 120 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
" See 25 CLEvE. BAR Ass'N J. 187 (1955).
'People ex rel. Kocourek v. City of Chicago, 193 II. 507, 62 N-B.179 (1901).
" 121 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio App. 1954).
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deed conveyances of the parcels of realty for the benefit of plaintiff and his
brother and sisters. All of the shares of the stock in said corporations were,
in violation of the agreement, issued to the -brother and sisters of plaintiff,
and, apparently, were at the time of action in their hands outside the State
of Ohio.
Plaintiff sought a decree to impress a constructive trust in his favor
upon a proportionate number of shares of stock in the corporations. He
obtained personal service within the state of Ohio upon the corporations
and some of the individual defendants. As to two non-resident individual
defendants he properly secured service by publication, but without any at-
tachment of any property in Ohio belonging to them. Plaintiff relied upon
that provision of the Code4' permitting service by publication in an action
relating to real or personal property in this state, when a non-resident de-
fendant or a foreign corporation has or claims a lien thereon or some inter-
est therein, or when it is sought to exclude him in whole or in part from
an interest therein. The foreign defendants appeared specially and moved
to quash; the trial court granted the motions, but the court of appeals re-
versed.
The question was one whether, for the purposes of jurisdiction in a
case of this type, the personalty (shares of stock) was in Ohio, where the
corporation was -before the court, or elsewhere at the residence of the share-
holders. Relying on an often cited United States Supreme Court case 2 and
a similar though not identical federal jurisdictional statute,43 the court of
appeals held that the stock was actually personal property in Ohio, the
"habitation or domicil of the company ... [which is the creature of] ... the
state that created it," and that the certificates of stock in the hands of the
absent defendants "were only evidence of the ownership of the shares."
This case should also be compared with that of Whitelaw v. Whitelaw,44
discussed in last year's survey,.45 which involved the jurisdiction of an Ohio
court to adjudicate with respect to an insurance policy, the physical indicia
of which were before the court, the defendant insured being absent and
served only by publication.
Trial by Jury in Declaratory
Judgment Action in Probate Court
A decedent's estate was under administration in probate court. After
the executor had been appointed and qualified, plaintiff, one of several
41OHIo RaV. CODE § 2703.14 (1).
'
2 Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559 (1900).
'Now 28 U.S.C. § 1655.
"65 Ohio L. Abs. 11, 113 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio App. 1952).
"5 WEsT. REs. L. Rav. 245 (1954).
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beneficiaries under decedenes will, filed an entirely separate and inde-
pendent action in probate court, praying for a declaratory judgment with
respect to her rights in certain items of personalty given to her by decedent
a few days prior to his death. Her petition asserted no rights because of or
arising under decedents will. The defendants were the executor and de-
cedenes next of kin and the other legatees under his will. Defendants de-
manded a jury trial. The probate court ruled that defendants were not
entitled to such a trial, but was reversed by the appellate court. The supreme
court affirmed the appellate cour, 4 but qualified the position of both.
Relying upon long established authority to the effect that the action for
a declaratory judgment is a creature of statute, enacted since the adoption
of the Ohio Constitution, and therefore not an action in which a trial by
jury is a matter of absolute right, the supreme court held that (1) a declara-
tory judgment is a "civil action"; (2) factual issues in actions under the
Declaratory Judgments Act47 are to be tried and determined in the same
manner as similar issues in other civil actions in the court in which the
proceeding is pending;48 (3) the determination of questions of fact in pro-
ceedings in probate court is to be made by the probate judge unless in his
discretion he orders them to be tried by a jury or referred;49 (4) the gen-
eral provisions of the Code relating to trial in civil cases of issues of law
on the one hand and of fact on the other hand" do not apply to trial in
the probate court.
Therefore, said the supreme court, it was the function of the probate
judge in his discretion to grant or refuse such a trial. Significantly, and
explicitly, the supreme court did not decide whether the probate court had
jurisdiction of the type of case posed by plaintiff's petition, saying that it
was not challenged and not, therefore, before the reviewing court. This
writer is moved to wonder, whether, since want of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter is never subject to waiver by the parties, it was not incumbent
upon the supreme court to raise and settle this issue, sua sponte.
Wrongful Death Action
All Beneficiaries Dead by Time of Trial
In Danis, Adm'r v,. New York Central R.R.8' the Supreme Court had
before it the question whether it should overrule a long established prin-
"Renee v. Sanders, 160 Ohio St. 279, 116 N.E.2d 420 (1953).
TOHo REv. CODE §§ 2721.01 to 2721.15, incl.
"Or-o REv. CODE § 2721.10.
"OHIo REv. CODE § 2101.31.
'Omo REv. CODE § 2311.04.
U 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 NXE.2d 39 (1954).
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ciple of law in Ohio;52 whether in an action for wrongful death, filed while
persons who were eligible participants in a recovery under the act were
still living, but which came on for trial at a time when all such eligible
participants had died, could continue to be prosecuted.
The court refused to overrule the established judicial precedent, saying
that after forty-four years of acquiesence in it, such changes must come from
the legislature.5
Joinder of Parties and Service in Will Contests
Counsel filing actions to contest the admission to probate of a will in
Ohio are faced with at least two technical obstacles. The statute of limita-
tions is short -six months after admission of the will to probate,55 and
all devisees, legatees and heirs of the testator, "other interested persons"
and the executor or administrator must be made parties.58 The requirement
as to parties is jurisdictional. 57
The court of appeals for Cuyahoga County had before it, in Gravier v.
Glath,5 8 an example of the difficulties which the combination of the two
requirements poses for counsel for contestants. Within the time prescribed
by statute three heirs at law who chose to be contestants filed an action,
naming as defendants and serving with process the executrix and the sole
named legatee, and naming also as defendants, but issuing no process for,
three other heirs at law. Months later, and long after the limitation had ex-
pired, the original plaintiffs obtained leave to amend the caption of their
petition and did so by writing in ink into the caption thereof the names of
the -three originally named but unserved parties defendant as parties plain-
tiff, together with nine other (apparently newly discovered) heirs at law of
the testator as parties plaintiff. No amendment was made of the body of
the petition.
Upon proper motion by the defendants legatee and executrix the trial
court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. The court of appeals,
one judge dissenting, affirmed.
The unhappy original plaintiffs argued that the provisions of the Code
to the effect that
'Doyle v. B. & 0. R. Co., 81 Ohio St. 184, 90 N.E. 165 (1909).
OHIo Rnv. CODE 5 2125.02.
See 5 WEsT. REs. L Ray. 426 (1954) wherein the principal case is extensively
discussed.
OHno REv. CoDE §§ 2107.23, 2741.09.
Orno REV. CoDE § 2741.02.
"Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177, 93 N.E.2d 683 (1950).
" 119 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio App. 1954).
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